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Abstract
Apart from the principles and methodologies inherited from Economics and Game
Theory, the studies in Algorithmic Mechanism Design typically employ the worst-case
analysis and approximation schemes of Theoretical Computer Science. For instance,
the approximation ratio, which is the canonical measure of evaluating how well an
incentive-compatible mechanism approximately optimizes the objective, is defined in
the worst-case sense. It compares the performance of the optimal mechanism against
the performance of a truthful mechanism, for all possible inputs.
In this paper, we take the average-case analysis approach, and tackle one of the
primary motivating problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design – the scheduling prob-
lem [Nisan and Ronen, 1999]. One version of this problem which includes a verification
component is studied by Koutsoupias [2014]. It was shown that the problem has a tight
approximation ratio bound of (n+1)/2 for the single-task setting, where n is the num-
ber of machines. We show, however, when the costs of the machines to executing the
task follow any independent and identical distribution, the average-case approximation
ratio of the mechanism given in [Koutsoupias, 2014] is upper bounded by a constant.
This positive result asymptotically separates the average-case ratio from the worst-case
ratio, and indicates that the optimal mechanism for the problem actually works well on
average, although in the worst-case the expected cost of the mechanism is Θ(n) times
that of the optimal cost.
1 Introduction
The field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design [Nisan and Ronen, 1999, 2001, Nisan et al., 2007,
Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009] focuses on optimization problems where the input is pro-
vided by self-interested agents that participate in the mechanism by reporting their private
information. These agents are utility maximizers so they may misreport their private in-
formation to the mechanism, if that results in a more favorable outcome to them. Given
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the reports from the agents as input, a mechanism is a function that maps the input to
allocations and payments if monetary transfers are allowed. The goal of the mechanism
designer is twofold. On the one hand, the objective is to motivate agents to always report
truthfully, regardless of what strategies the other agents follow; on the other hand, the aim
is to optimize a specific objective function that measures the quality of the outcome, sub-
ject to a polynomial-time implementability constraint. However, these objectives are usually
incompatible. Therefore, often we need to trade one objective to achieve the other. One
standard approach is to maintain the truthfulness property of the mechanism, and approx-
imately optimize the specific objective function (e.g., social welfare maximization, revenue
maximization, or cost minimization). The approximation ratio is the canonical measure for
evaluating the performance of a truthful mechanism towards this goal. It compares the per-
formance of the truthful mechanism against the optimal mechanism which is not necessarily
truthful, over all possible inputs.
The approximation ratio is defined in the worst-case sense which resembles the worst-
case time complexity of the algorithms. These are strong but very pessimistic measures.
On the one hand, if it is possible to obtain a small worst-case ratio, then it is a very solid
guarantee on the performance of the mechanism no matter what input is provided. On the
other hand, if it turns out to be a large value, then one can hardly judge the performance
of the mechanism as it may perform well on most inputs and perform poorly on only a
few inputs. To address this issue, Deng et al. [2017] propose an alternative measure, the
average-case approximation ratio, that compares the performance of the truthful mechanism
against the optimal mechanism, averaged over all possible inputs when they follow a certain
distribution. Although average-case analysis is usually more complex than the worst-case
analysis, it provides a different measure.
In this paper, we study the problem of scheduling unrelated machines without money.
Scheduling is one of the primary problems in algorithmic mechanism design. In the general
setting, the problem is to schedule a set of tasks to n unrelated machines with private pro-
cessing times, in order to minimize the makespan. The machines (alternatively, speaking of
the agents in game theoretical settings) are rational and want to minimize their execution
time. They may achieve this by misreporting their processing times to the mechanism. No
monetary payments are allowed in this problem. The objective is to design truthful mecha-
nisms with good approximation ratio. One important version of the problem is studied by
Koutsoupias [2014] in which the machines are bound by their declarations. More specifically,
in case a machine declares a longer time than its actual time for a task and it is allocated
the task, then in practice its processing time must be the declared value. This is in the spirit
that machines have been observed during the execution of the task and cannot afford to
be caught lying about the execution times (an unaffordable penalty would apply). One can
consider this as a monitoring model of the problem and it is more complex than some other
models. Koutsoupias [2014] devises a truthful-in-expectation mechanism which achieves the
tight bound of n+1
2
for one task, and generalizes to n(n+1)
2
for multiple tasks when the ob-
jective is minimizing makespan and n+1
2
when the objective is minimizing social cost. We
note that, the tight bound instance is obtained when the ratio of the minimum value of the
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processing times against the maximum value of the processing times approaches 0. Obvi-
ously this instance is very unlikely to occur in practice. Therefore, it would be interesting
to understand how well the optimal mechanism given in [Koutsoupias, 2014] performs on
average, when the instances are chosen from a certain distribution.
1.1 Our contribution
This paper provides a fresh view of the performance of the mechanism developed by Koutsoupias
[2014]. In particular, we show the following:
• The average-case approximation ratio of the mechanism devised by Koutsoupias [2014]
is upper bounded by a constant, no matter which distribution is given.
In contrast, the worst-case approximation ratio of the mechanism shown in [Koutsoupias,
2014] is n+1
2
which is asymptotically different.
A major criticism of the average-case analysis is that the results usually depend on
the assumptions about the distribution of inputs, and these are not guaranteed to hold in
practice. Even for the same mechanism, when it is applied to different application areas,
the real-world distribution may vary. For example, Deng et al. [2017] only show that their
average-case result holds for a uniform distribution; the positive results in the Bayesian
analysis of auctions usually need to assume that the hazard rate function is monotone non-
decreasing. In this paper, we develop a powerful proof that works for any i.i.d distribution.
This is extraordinary in the average-case analysis literature, even in the more established
space such as the analysis of time complexity of algorithms. Our results imply that, although
the worst-case approximation ratios of the known mechanisms are quite negative, the average-
case approximation ratios are rather positive.
1.2 Related work
The field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design was initiated by [Nisan and Ronen, 1999, 2001]
and is further enriched by [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009] to approximate mechanism
design without money. For a more detailed investigation, we refer the reader to [Nisan et al.,
2007].
The scheduling problem has been extensively studied. However, after nearly two decades,
we still have little progress in resolving this challenge. The known approximation ratio up-
per bounds are rather negative, and there is a large gap between the lower bounds and
upper bounds. For the model presented by [Nisan and Ronen, 1999] where payments are
allowed to facilitate designing truthful mechanisms, the best known upper bound is given in
their original paper and is achieved by allocating each task independently using the classical
VCG mechanism, while the best known lower bound is 2.61 [Koutsoupias and Vidali, 2013].
Ashlagi et al. [2012] prove that the upper bound of n is tight for anonymous mechanisms. For
randomized mechanisms, the best known upper bound is n+1
2
shown by Mu’alem and Schapira
[2007]. For the special case of related machines, where the private information of each
machine is a single value, Archer and Tardos [2001] give an randomized 3-approximation
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mechanism. Lavi and Swamy [2009] show a constant approximation ratio for the special
case that the processing times of each task can take one of two fixed values. Yu [2009]
generalize this result to two-range-values, while together with Lu and Yu [2008] and Lu
[2009], they show constant bounds for the case of two machines. For the setting that pay-
ments are not allowed, Koutsoupias [2014] first considers the setting that the machines are
bound by their declarations. This is influenced by the notion of impositions that appears
in [Fotakis and Tzamos, 2013] for the facility location problems, as well as the notion of
verification that appears in [Auletta et al., 2009]. Penna and Ventre [2014] present a general
construction of collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification that return optimal solu-
tions for a wide class of mechanism design problems, including the scheduling problem. The
mechanism presented in [Koutsoupias, 2014] has a tight approximation ratio bound of n+1
2
for the single-task setting; by running the mechanism independently on multiple tasks a
tight bound of n+1
2
can be achieved for social cost minimization and an upper bound of
n(n+1)
2
can be achieved for the makespan minimization. Kova´cs et al. [2015] further ap-
ply mechanism design with monitoring techniques to the truthful RAM allocation prob-
lem. There are some works on characterizing truthful mechanisms in scheduling problems,
such as [Kova´cs and Vidali, 2015], as well as scheduling with uncertain execution time, such
as [Conitzer and Vidali, 2014].
In [Deng et al., 2017], the authors propose to study the average-case and smoothed ap-
proximation ratios, and conduct these analyses on the one-sided matching problem. They
show that, although the asymptotically best truthful mechanism for the problem is random
priority and its worst-case approximation ratio is bounded by Θ(
√
n), random priority has
a constant average-case approximation ratio when the inputs follow a uniform distribution,
and it has a constant smoothed approximation ratio.
Notably, the analysis of average-case approximation ratio takes a similar but fundamen-
tally different approach to the Bayesian analysis. In the Bayesian auction design literature
[Chawla and Sivan, 2014, Hartline and Lucier, 2010], the focus is on how well a truthful
mechanism can approximately maximize the expected revenue, when instances are taken
from the entire input space. More specifically, the dominant approach in the study of
Bayesian auction design is the ratio of expectations. A more detailed comparison of the
two metrics will be given in the next section after their definitions are given.
2 Preliminaries
In the problem of scheduling unrelated machines without payment, there are a set of self-
interested machines (alternatively, speaking of self-interested agents in game theoretical set-
tings) and a set of tasks. The general setting comprises n machines and m tasks. In this
paper we consider the setting of a single task. The machines are lazy and prefer not to
execute any tasks. There are no monetary tools to incentivise machines to execute tasks.
Machine i needs time (or cost) ti to execute the task, i ∈ [n]. These ti’s are independent to
each other. There could be two different objectives. One is to allocate the task to machines
so that the makespan is minimized; the other is to allocate the task so that the social cost is
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minimized. The makespan is the total length of the schedule, and the social cost is the sum
of all agents’ costs. In the single-task setting, these two objectives are identical. Obviously,
allocating the task to the machine with minimum execution time is the optimal solution.
However, the mechanism has no access to the values ti. Instead, each machine reports an
execution time t˜i to the mechanism, where t˜i is not necessarily equal to ti, ∀i ∈ [n]. A
mechanism is a (possibly randomized) algorithm which computes an allocation based on the
declarations t˜i of the machines. Denote the output of the mechanism by p = (pi)i∈[n], where
pi is an indicator variable in deterministic mechanisms and is the probability of machine i
getting allocated to execute the task in randomized mechanisms. We follow the standard
literature and consider the case that machines are bound by their reports. That is, the cost
of machine i for the task is max{ti, t˜i}. So in case a machine i declares t˜i ≥ ti and it is
allocated the task, then its actual cost is the declared value t˜i and not ti. This is in the
spirit that machines are being observed during the execution of the task and cannot afford
to be caught lying about the execution times (a high penalty would apply). Therefore, the
expected cost of machine i is ci = ci(ti, t˜) = pi(t˜)max(ti, t˜i). In approximate mechanism
design, we restrict our interest to the class of truthful mechanisms. A mechanism is truthful
if for any report of other agents, the expected cost ci of agent i is minimized when t˜i = ti.
We note that this weak notion of truthfulness, truthful-in-expectation, enables us to con-
sider a richer class of mechanisms than universal truthfulness. However, as mentioned in
the Introduction, even with this rich class of truthful mechanisms, the performance of these
mechanisms is still very limited in terms of approximation ratio. The canonical measure of
efficiency of a truthful mechanism M is the worst-case approximation ratio,
rworst(M) = sup
t∈T
SCM(t)
SCOPT(t)
,
where SCOPT(t) = minp∈P
∑n
i=1 ci is the optimal social cost which is essentially the minimum
ti, for all i ∈ [n]; SCM(t) is the social cost of the mechanism M on the input t; and T is the
input space. This ratio compares the social cost of the truthful mechanism M against the
social cost of the optimal mechanism OPT over all possible inputs t.
In [Koutsoupias, 2014], the author devises the following randomized mechanism.
Mechanism M: Given the input t = (t1, . . . , tn), without loss of generality, let the values
of ti’s be in ascending order 0 < t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn. Then the allocation probabilities are
p1 =
1
t1
∫ t1
0
n∏
i=2
(
1− y
ti
)
dy,
pk =
1
t1tk
∫ t1
0
∫ y
0
∏
i=2,...,n
i 6=k
(
1− x
ti
)
dxdy, for k 6= 1.
Note that this is a symmetric mechanism, so it suffices to describe it when 0 < t1 ≤ t2 ≤
· · · ≤ tn. It is shown in [Koutsoupias, 2014] that this mechanism is truthful and achieves an
approximation ratio tight bound of n+1
2
.
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Analogously to the definition of the average-case approximation ratio of mechanisms for
social welfare maximization in Deng et al. [2017], we define it for social cost minimization
as follows:
raverage(M) = Et∼D
[
SCM(t)
SCOPT(t)
]
,
where the input t = (t1, . . . , tn) is chosen from a distribution D. Hence, the metric we study
in this paper is the expectation of the ratio.
2.1 Comparison with the Bayesian Approach
In Bayesian mechanism design [Chawla and Sivan, 2014, Hartline and Lucier, 2010], there
is also a prior distribution from which the agent types come from. However, the objective
is to characterize the maximum ratio (for some given distribution of the agent types) of
the expected social welfare (or social cost) of a truthful mechanism over the expected social
welfare (or social cost) of the optimal mechanism. So, the metric in the study of the Bayesian
approach is the ratio of expectations. That is, the objective is to characterize the ratio r in
the following formula,
r · E [SCOPT(t)] ≤ E [SCM(t)] .
Therefore, in Bayesian approach, the optimal mechanism is in respect of the entire input
space. In other words, it outputs the optimal solution in expectation, when the inputs run
over the entire prior distribution. In contrast, in the analysis of average-case approximation
ratio, the optimal mechanism is in respect of each individual input instance. So, if we
interpret the optimal mechanism as an adversary to the truthful mechanism, this adversary
can take different actions in each round.
In light of this difference, also due to the fact that the expectation of the ratio is a
nonlinear function of the two random variables, the analysis of average-case approximation
ratio introduces more technical challenges. In some specific scenarios, a constant average-case
approximation ratio would imply a constant approximation ratio under Bayesian approach.
3 Average-case Approximation Ratio
In this section we show that the average-case approximation ratio of the mechanism M is
upper bounded by a constant, when the inputs ti’s follow any independent and identical
distribution D[tmin,∞), where tmin is the minimum processing time for the task.
Let h be a constant, and denote event A = {tn
2
≤ h · tmin}. So, it corresponds to the
case that the n
2
-th order statistic of the inputs ti’s is less than or equal to h · tmin. Firstly,
we show that if A is true, then the social cost of the mechanism M is upper bounded by a
constant times t1.
Lemma 1 For any constant h > 0, given that event A holds, we have
SCM(t) ≤ (2h+ 1)t1.
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Proof: The expected cost of the mechanism M is
SCM(t) =
n∑
i=1
pi · ti =
∫ t1
0
n∏
i=2
(
1− y
ti
)
dy +
n∑
k=2
1
t1
∫ t1
0
∫ y
0
∏
i=2,...,n
i 6=k
(
1− x
ti
)
dxdy
Since 1− y
ti
≤ 1 for any y ∈ [0, t1] , i = 2, . . . , n, we can simply bound the first term by∫ t1
0
n∏
i=2
(
1− y
ti
)
dy ≤
∫ t1
0
1dy = t1
Because event A holds, i.e., tn
2
≤ h · tmin, we have
∏
i=2,...,n
i 6=k
(
1− x
ti
)
≤
(
1− x
h·tmin
)n
2
−2
·
1
n
2 , ∀k = 2, . . . , n. So we can bound the second term as follows.
n∑
k=2
1
t1
∫ t1
0
∫ y
0
∏
i=2,...,n
i 6=k
(
1− x
ti
)
dxdy ≤
n∑
k=2
1
t1
∫ t1
0
∫ y
0
(
1− x
h · tmin
)n
2
−2
· 1n2 dxdy
≤ n− 1
t1
∫ t1
0
∫ y
0
(
1− x
h · t1
)n
2
−2
dxdy
=
n− 1
t1
∫ t1
0
(
2ht1
n− 2 −
2ht1
n− 2
(
1− y
ht1
)n
2
−1)
dy
=
n− 1
t1
[
2ht21
n− 2 +
4h2t21
n(n− 2)
((
1− 1
h
)n
2
− 1
)]
≤ n− 1
n− 2 · 2ht1
< 2h · t1
So, SCM(t) =
∑n
i=1 pi · ti ≤ (2h+ 1)t1. 
Since SCOPT(t) = t1, we get the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 When event A holds, we have
Et∼D
[
SCM(t)
SCOPT(t)
]
≤ 2h+ 1.
Obviously, Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 hold regardless of the distribution.
Secondly, we show that there exists a constant h such that event A occurs with a large
probability. Intuitively, the larger h is, the higher probability that event A occurs. We will
need the following Lemma to find such an h.
Lemma 2 For any n > 1, we have
(
n
n/2
) ≤ e
pi
√
n
· 2n, where e is the base of the natural
logarithm.
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Proof: According to the estimation by Robbins [1955],
n! =
√
2pinn+
1
2 e−n+r(n),
where 1
12n+1
< r(n) < 1
12n
. Here we only need a looser bound to prove our lemma, i.e.,
√
2pinn+
1
2 e−n < n! <
√
2pinn+
1
2 e−n+
1
12n < nn+
1
2 e−n+1.
We have (
n
n/2
)
=
n!
(n
2
)!(n
2
)!
≤ e
√
n(n
e
)n(√
2pi n
2
(
n
2e
)n
2
)2 = epi√n · 2n

Next we show that event A can occur with a large probability, with a properly choosing
h.
Lemma 3 For any n > 1, there exists a constant h, such that F (htmin) ≥ 1112 , and we have
Pr[A] ≥ 1− e
2pi
· 1
n
Proof: Since event A = {tn
2
≤ h · tmin}, the probability that event A occurs can be
calculated by
Pr[A] = Pr[tn
2
≤ h · tmin] =
n∑
k=n
2
(
n
k
)
(F (htmin))
k (1− F (htmin))n−k
= 1−
n
2
−1∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
(F (htmin))
k (1− F (htmin))n−k (1)
Since (1− F (htmin))n−k ≤ (1− F (htmin))n/2,
(
n
k
) ≤ ( n
n/2
)
, k = 0, · · · , n
2
−1, and (F (htmin))k <
1, we get
(1) ≥ 1−
n
2
−1∑
k=0
(
n
n/2
)
(1− F (htmin))
n
2
= 1− n
2
(
n
n/2
)
(1− F (htmin))
n
2
≥ 1− n
2
· e
pi
√
n
· 2n · (1− F (htmin))
n
2 (2)
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By choosing h such that F (htmin) ≥ 1112 , we get
(2) ≥ 1− n
2
· e
pi
√
n
· 2n ·
(
1
12
)n
2
= 1− e
2pi
· √n · 3−n2
≥ 1− e
2pi
· 1
n
The last inequality is due to 3n ≥ n3, ∀n > 1.
Therefore, Pr[A] ≥ 1− e
2pi
· 1
n
. 
We can then bound the probability of the case that the expected cost of the mechanism
M is larger than (2h+ 1)t1.
Lemma 4 When event A holds, and for the choice of h in the above lemma, we have
Pr [SCM(t) > (2h+ 1)t1] <
e
2pi
· 1
n
.
Proof: According to Lemma 1, event A implies SCM(t) ≤ (2h+ 1)t1, so we have
Pr[A] ≤ Pr[SCM(t) ≤ (2h+ 1)t1]
Hence,
1− Pr[A] ≥ Pr[SCM(t) > (2h+ 1)t1]
According to Lemma 3, we have
1− Pr[A] ≤ e
2pi
· 1
n
So,
Pr [SCM(t) > (2h+ 1)t1] <
e
2pi
· 1
n

We have established necessary building blocks. By carefully choosing the parameter h,
we can partition the valuation space into two sets: {SCM(t) ≤ (2h + 1)t1} and {SCM(t) >
(2h+1)t1}. Last, we will use Corollary 1 and Lemma 4 to prove our main result. Essentially,
Corollary 1 upper bounds the expected approximation ratio of the first case and Lemma 4
upper bounds the probability of the second case occurring. Note that in any case, the worst-
case ratio is upper bounded by n+1
2
according to [Koutsoupias, 2014]. By adding them up
together, we obtain our upper bound.
Theorem 1 For any distribution on [tmin,+∞), and a constant h such that F (htmin) ≥ 1112 ,
the average-case approximation ratio of the mechanism M is upper bounded by 2h + 1.33.
That is,
raverage = Et∼D
[
SCM(t)
SCOPT(t)
]
< 2h+ 1.33
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Proof: It is easy to see that the above two sets are collectively exhaustive and mutually
exclusive, and Lemma 4 holds. So we have
raverage = Et∼D
[
SCM(t)
SCOPT(t)
]
≤ Pr [SCM(t) ≤ (2h+ 1)t1] · E
[
SCM(t)
SCOPT(t)
]
+ Pr [SCM(t) > (2h+ 1)t1] · E
[
SCM(t)
SCOPT(t)
]
≤ Pr [SCM(t) ≤ (2h+ 1)t1] · (2h+ 1) + Pr [SCM(t) > (2h+ 1)t1] · n + 1
2
≤ 1 · (2h+ 1) + e
2pi
· 1
n
· n + 1
2
= 2h+ 1 +
e
4pi
· n+ 1
n
≤ 2h+ 1 + 3e
8pi
< 2h+ 1.33
Therefore, the average-case approximation ratio of the mechanism M is upper bounded by
2h+ 1.33. 
In hindsight, when the costs of the machines ti’s follow any heavy-tailed distribution, no
matter how heavy is the tail, the mechanism M has a constant average-case approximation
ratio bound. However, this was not intuitively clear beforehand, as the social cost of the
mechanism M depends on how often the inputs contain large ti and how big they are.
In the following, we give a few examples of the distribution to show the choice of h and
the constant upper bounds for these distributions.
Example 1: Pareto Distribution
The Pareto distribution is a power law distribution that is widely used in the description of
social, scientific, geophysical, actuarial, and many other types of observable phenomena. Ac-
cording to the influential studies by [Arlitt and Williamson, 1996] and [Reed and Jorgensen,
2004] as well as the references therein, the distributions of the file size (of web server workload
and of Internet traffic which uses the TCP protocol) match well with the Pareto distribution.
That is, for a random variable T chosen from this Pareto distribution, the probability
that T is smaller than a value t, is given by
F (t) = Pr(T < t) =
{
1− ( tmin
t
)α
t ≥ tmin
0 t < tmin
where α > 0 is the tail index of the distribution.
Note that in the proof of Theorem 1, the only place we need to deal with the particular
distribution is Lemma 3. So, by handling the constant h for the Pareto distribution, we
obtain the following result.
Theorem 2 For the Pareto distribution, let h = 12
1
α . The average-case approximation ratio
of the mechanism M is upper bounded by 2 · 12 1α + 1.33.
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Proof: For the Pareto distribution, let h = 12
1
α . In Lemma 3, we would have
Pr[A] = Pr[tn
2
≤ h · tmin] =
n∑
k=n
2
(
n
k
)
(F (htmin))
k (1− F (htmin))n−k
=
n∑
k=n
2
(
n
k
)(
1− 1
hα
)k (
1
hα
)n−k
= 1−
n
2
−1∑
k=0
(
n
k
)(
1− 1
hα
)k (
1
hα
)n−k
≥ 1−
n
2
−1∑
k=0
(
n
n/2
)(
1
hα
)n
2
= 1− n
2
(
n
n/2
)(
1
hα
)n
2
≥ 1− n
2
· e
pi
√
n
· 2n
(
1
hα
)n
2
= 1− n
2
· e
pi
√
n
· 2n
(
1
12
)n
2
= 1− e
2pi
· √n · 3−n2
≥ 1− e
2pi
· 1
n
The rest of the proof follows the proof in Theorem 1. 
Example 2: Exponential Distribution
We then consider the case that machines’ costs ti’s are independent variables and follow
a truncated Exponential distribution D[tmin,∞). That is, for a random variable T chosen
from this Exponential distribution, the probability that T is smaller than a value t, is given
by
F (t) = Pr(T < t) =
{
1− 1
eλt
t ≥ tmin
0 t < tmin
where λ > 0 is the tail index of the distribution.
Theorem 3 For the Exponential distribution, let h = 1
λtmin
ln 12. The average-case approx-
imation ratio of the mechanism M is upper bounded by 2 · 1
λtmin
ln 12 + 1.33.
The proof is omitted here.
Example 3: Log-logistic Distribution
The log-logistic distribution is the probability distribution of a random variable whose
logarithm has a logistic distribution. It is similar in shape to the log-normal distribution
but has heavier tails. It is used in networking to model the transmission times of data. The
cumulative distribution function is
F (t;α, β) =
tβ
αβ + tβ
where α > 0 is a scale parameter and β > 0 is a shape parameter. For simplicity, we take
α = 1 and have the following result.
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Theorem 4 For the Log-logistic distribution, let h = 1
tmin
· e ln 11β . The average-case approxi-
mation ratio of the mechanism M is upper bounded by 2 · 1
tmin
· e ln 11β + 1.33.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we extend the worst-case approximation ratio analysis for the scheduling
problem studied in [Koutsoupias, 2014] to the average-case approximation ratio analysis.
We show that, when the costs of the machines are independent and identically distributed,
the average-case approximation ratios of the optimal mechanism M have constant bounds,
which is asymptotically better than the worst-case approximation ratios. Our results offer
some relief for applying the mechanism M in practice, apart from the fact that in the worst
case the expected cost of the mechanism is Θ(n) times of what the optimal cost is.
A lot of problems remain open. Firstly, as we employ the worst-case analysis as a frame-
work for comparing truthful mechanisms, the average-case analysis is also a framework for
doing so. Although the mechanism M in [Koutsoupias, 2014] is the best mechanism for the
problem in terms of the worst-case ratio, it is not clear whether there is any other mecha-
nism could be better than M in terms of average-case ratio. In any attempts to comparing
M and other mechanisms, the specific distribution that the inputs follow matters, as we have
pointed out that the assumptions on the distribution are vital in the average-case analysis
so the comparison has to be done on the same distribution. There may not be a mechanism
that is universally best for any distribution.
Secondly, it would be interesting to show some lower bounds for the average-case ratio of
any truthful mechanism, but one should expect some much more involved arguments than
their worst-case lower bound counterparts, and again, very likely different distributions need
to be handled differently.
One might query the smoothed analysis of the mechanism M. We should note that, unlike
the random priority mechanism studied in Deng et al. [2017] that has a constant smoothed
approximation ratio, the smoothed ratio of the mechanism M would not be asymptotically
different from the worst-case ratio. To see this, the tight bound example in the worst-
case analysis of the mechanism M is obtained when the ratio of the minimum value of
the processing times against the maximum value of the processing times approaches 0, i.e.,
t1/tn → 0. Obviously, any small perturbation around these inputs would not change the
nature of this fact.
Many more approximate mechanism design problems deserve average-case analysis to
understand the nature of the problems and the performance of the mechanisms.
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